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 As we enter uncharted waters in terms of the outcome of the global crisis of capitalism 
which has only got more serious since 2007 we might well ask if it represents a new global 
opportunity for labour and the subaltern classes more generally. In particular I seek to address 
the complex and sometimes conflictual relations between trade unions, migration and the 
ongoing processes of social transformation. In the first instance I pose the Challenges which 
migration represents for trade unions in the context of globalisation. More broadly I examine the 
challenges for progressive social theory posed by the current global crisis. I then move on to the 
Mutations of the global system on the basis of Gramsci’s dictum that ‘the old has died but the 
new has not yet been born’. This is the necessary framework for the subsequent analysis of 
Workers in the context of the processes of globalisation and precarisation. My hypothesis is that 
we are now moving beyond the categories of North and South in terms of the mutations of 
capitalism and their impact on the workers of the world (see Munck 2011). Finally, I turn to the 
sometimes under-rated Complexity of the way workers are responding to the mutations of 
capitalism and thus posing a very real challenge to the stable reproduction of capitalist rule. I 
sketch out the limitations of a rights-based labour response to exploitation and the opportunities 




 Trade unions today face many challenges as a result of a quarter century of neoliberal 
globalisation and its resultant decomposition of labour. Migration – the free mobility of labour – 
has traditionally been seen as a problem for trade unions. Migrant workers have been seen as 
undermining well established labour norms and, for that matter, a ‘difficult to organise’ sector.  
Much as workers are divided by gender, age and ethnicity they are also divided according to 
national origin and citizen status. What I am proposing here, in terms of turning capital’s global 
crisis into labour’s global opportunity, is a decisive shift towards migration as a hinge in terms of 
the future of globalisation and as an opportunity for a trade unions revitalization in pursuit of 
social transformation. At a historical conjuncture when national protectionism, xenophobia and 
racism are bound to come to the fore, this approach may, at the very least, play a positive role in 
terms of defending democracy and, perhaps, forwarding social transformation.  
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 At a broad level we can state that neoliberal globalisation has always contained a 
contradiction in regards to the free mobility of labour. In a no doubt apocryphal tale neoliberal 
guru Milton Friedman once said that, ‘About labour migration the least said the better’. There is 
indeed no theoretically coherent explanation as to why one factor of production – capital – 
should have free mobility and not another. Roberto Unger has argued against this selective 
understanding of freedom, that 'nothing would contribute more to a rapid moderation of 
inequalities between nations than a greater freedom for the movement of labour’ (Unger 2011: 
130). His proposal is for an in principle agreement to free movement and then small cumulative 
steps that capital and labour take together. This would produce a shared commitment to the 
building of a common future. Of course the global order and the nature of the states which make 
it up would have to be thoroughly transformed. Whether we think that ‘open borders’ is a viable 
political strategy or not, whatever happens at this global level will have a serious impact on social 
transformation at national and local levels.  
 As to trade unions – as organisers of the ‘factor of production’ labour – they have often 
throughout history, in practice if not programmatically, displayed a protectionist attitude 
towards the free mobility of workers. There are many historical examples of trade unions 
opposing the entry of foreign workers into the national labour market or seeking social exclusion 
of those already there (see Penninx and Rossblad 2001). More recently there has been a 
recognition, from within the trade unions themselves, that ‘solidarity with migrant workers is 
helping trade unions to get back to the basic principles of the labour movement’ (David 2002: 
2). One argument is that to ‘democratize globalization’ the same level of movement by workers 
which applies at the national level should prevail. Latin American trade unions have committed 
to ‘promoting increasing, strengthening and guaranteeing the freedom of movement for all 
workers… to stay in their own land, emigrate, immigrate and return’ (Godio 2005: 56). As 
against the contradictions of neo-liberalism, a labour movement should recognise that migrant 
workers are an integral part of the working class and that they have often played a pivotal role in 
the making of labour movements. 
 In recent years trade unions in most parts of the world have begun to recover from the 
impact of neoliberalism and its unregulated market approach. This has occurred at peak level 
with the formation of a unified trade union confederation                                                                                 
as a result of the end of the Cold War. The old International Trade Secretariats also become 
energised as the new World Councils which organise internationally across a given sector. At a 
national level there has been a certain resurgence by trade unions in some regions such as in Latin 
America, while in the US there was a marked political radicalization at peak level. The growing 
academic literature on trade union revitalization has found evidence transnationally of advances 
in key areas of activity such as the organising of new sectors of workers, greater political activity, 
the reform of trade union structure, building of coalitions and, not least, an increase in 
international solidarity activity (Frege and Kelly 2003). We could argue that we are at the start of 
a phase when trade unionism will yet again be reconfigured and revitalized to meet the new 
conditions it faces. 
 Labour has always been slow to adapt to capital’s mutations and crises. That there has 
been a time lag of 25 years between the neoliberal capitalist offensive and labour’s re-composition 
is hardly surprising and fits the pattern of 19th and 20th century waves of labour disintegration 
and recomposition (Arrighi 1996: 348). This cyclical nature of labour-capital relations seems to 
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have been ignored by analysts circa 2000 who perhaps reflected the mood at the time that US 
capitalism had really broken the cyclical nature of capitalism. Thus Castells argued that, ‘The 
labour movement seems to be historically superseded’ (Castells 2004: 425) because while capital 
is global, labour is local: ‘labour is disaggregated in its performance, fragmented in its 
organization, diversified in its existence, divided in its collective action' (Castells 1996: 475).  
While some of these points were conjuncturally correct the overall analysis ignored the fact that 
labour is a social movement. A more long-term view of the last century would show that trade 
unions have not only endured but that they have also been ‘making society more democratic, 
more respectful of the poor, moving human rights above the claims of capitalist property’ 
(Friedman 2008: 10). That is no mean achievement given the brutality of the neoliberal counter-
revolution. 
 If the current crisis poses a challenge to the organised labour movement it also requires a 
more robust response from critical social thought than we have seen until now. At one level the 
current crisis of capitalism vindicates the traditional Marxist reading of capitalism and its 
contradictions. This has been recognised across the political spectrum – albeit grudgingly – since 
the outbreak of the crisis in 2007. Since the last major crisis of capitalism in the 1930’s the world 
system has embarked on two major policy regimes. Keynesianism led to the Bretton Wood 
‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1984) regime which lasted until approximately 1975; allowing for 
market allocation of resources but constrained by the political process and allowing for social 
need. This was followed by the neo-liberal ‘efficient market hypothesis’ (Farmer and Lo 1999) 
which provided the rationale for globalization and the extension of a new economic order across 
the globe. Today we are faced with the conundrum of ‘financial regime change’ (Wade 2008) 
which the powers that be will find no easier to achieve than the ‘regime change’ in Iraq carried 
out at the peak of US arrogance across the globe. 
 Marxism allows us to understand the re-making of the working class on a global scale 
over the last 30 years or so. The dynamic (yet destructive) nature of this system is evident not 
least in the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) as vibrant centres of capital expansion 
and accumulation in a ‘classical’ mode. New working classes are being forged in these regimes 
and the future of class struggle will depend largely on their outcome. As Mike Davis puts it 
laconically, ‘Two hundred million Chinese factory workers, miners and construction labourers 
are the most dangerous class on the planet. (Just ask the State Council in Beijing.) Their full 
awakening from the bubble may yet determine whether or not a socialist Earth is possible’ (Davis 
2012: 15). What we need to add, however, to this classic Marxist perspective is an understanding 
of how ‘primitive accumulation’ continues to operate through ‘accumulation through 
dispossession’, a ‘Third-worldist’ perspective articulated before its time by Rosa Luxemburg 
against Lenin and the other orthodox Marxists of her day. 
 Karl Polanyi – coming out of the European socialist tradition but also influenced by 
Christian thinking – developed a bold new paradigm of capitalist development following the 
Second World War. While much of his analysis of capitalist development is recognisably Marxist 
he departs from this analytical tradition in several key ways. His broad sweeping ‘double 
movement’ thesis – market deregulation followed by society protecting itself – captured the 
mood that neo-liberal globalization had its limits. Protests against environmental degradation, 
movements against ‘free trade’ agreements or struggles against factory closures could find a 
unifying thread here. This was not the inevitable working out of capitalist contradictions as in an 
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economistic Marxism, but a perspective which allowed free rein to human agency and society. 
Against the class reductionism still present in much of Marxism, Polanyi argued that only a 
perspective from above that of a particular social class could be successful in articulating a 
counter-movement. Finally, Polanyi argued explicitly against Marx that labour was not a 
commodity: ‘Labour is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself …. it 
cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused without affecting also the 
human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity’ ( Polanyi 2001: 75-
6). 
 It is in relation to decommodification that Polanyi probably provides his most powerful 
strategic insight into current movements beyond neoliberalism. The socially disembedded self-
regulating market will inevitable be challenged by the self-protective tendencies in society.  Thus, 
for example, according to Polanyi the function of trade unions was not to get a higher price for 
the commodity of labour but, rather, ‘that of interfering with the laws of supply and demand in 
respect of human labor, and removing it from the orbit of the market’ (Polanyi 2001: 186). All 
moves from within the social realm aimed at constraining the unregulated operation of the 
market – decommodification – thus challenge the market economy in its fundamentals. The 
strategy of decommodification and of re-embedding the economy within society can serve as a 
‘logic of equivalence’ acting to articulate a range of very diverse protective or defensive struggles 
by subaltern nations, classes and ethnic groups. This is a necessary supplement to the classical 




 It seems clear we are now living a historical period similar to that which Antonio Gramsci 
characterised as one in which ‘the old has died but the new cannot yet be born’ (Gramsci 1970: 
276). While neoliberal globalisation continues to dominate it no longer has hegemony.  
Dominant class strategy is in disarray across the world and in some regions it has reached crisis 
point. Are we at one of those conjunctures when major mutations of the system are about to 
occur? What are the prospects for the elaboration of an alternative hegemony emerging from the 
subaltern nations, classes and ethnic-religious groups? Whatever our answers to these difficult 
questions I think we can agree on the need to pose them in an affirmative way. Too many 
interventions around workers and migrants (not to mention the precariat) are posed defensively 
as a reaction to the violation of assumed human rights. Now is perhaps the time to forge 
alternative hegemonic thinking and put some shape on the hitherto rather vacuous formulation 
that ‘another world is possible’ (cf. Santos 2006). 
The dominant economic model generated massive social transformation via globalization, 
financial deregulation, privatization and commodification of the life course.  The deregulation of 
the financial markets – as the Eurozone now acknowledges – created a series of asset bubbles 
which came to a head in the US in 2007. A shadow banking system had outstripped the 
regulated banking sector. So then, as Robin Blackburn puts it, ‘The banks heedless pursuit of 
short-term advantage led to the largest destruction of value in world history during the Crash of 
2008. Government rescue measures were to offer unlimited liquidity to the financial sector, while 
leaving the system largely intact’ (Blackburn 2011b: 35). That is to say, neoliberal ideologies and 
their supporters have lost hegemony but they remain dominant. While Keynesianism is the 
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intellectual inspiration for all types of critics of the crisis, a coherent alternative path has not yet 
been forged and, in fact, most counter-measures will simply accentuate the crisis through so-
called austerity measures against working people. 
In the early days of the crisis mainstream interpretation pinned its hopes in the BRICS, 
now seen as detached from the financial crisis. China and India might slow their pace of growth 
but they would act as engines of global recovery. There were hopes pinned on the informal sector 
which would act as a safety net for those thrown out of work. The former Chief Economist of 
the IMF told us that, ‘The situation in desperately poor countries isn’t as bad as you’d think’ 
(cited in Breman 2009: 30). In reality the crisis was very soon seen to be world-wide – an 
inevitable consequence of globalization – and thus it was clearly systemic. The much vaunted 
technological New Age had not materialized. The flotation of Facebook and renewable energy 
would hardly generate a new model of accelerated growth. As to the BRICs, export led growths 
slowed down in the midst of a global recession and a ‘hard landing’ for China has now been 
forecast. ‘A thoroughly triangulated global recession’ (Davis 2011: 14) now loomed with the US, 
Europe and the BRICs all involved in a ‘perfect storm’ scenario that even Karl Marx could not 
have imagined. 
The impact of the crisis on workers and migrant workers in particular was massive and 
unfolded very rapidly. Globalisation had created an economically, socially and spatially much 
more integrated world. Labour diasporas have formed dense social networks intimately integrated 
into the spatial expansion of capitalism. It is through these networks, as David Harvey puts it, 
that ‘we now see the effects of the financial crash spreading into almost every nook and cranny of 
rural Africa and peasant India’ (Harvey 2010: 147). In the OECD countries the role of 
unemployment is climbing rapidly with systemic failover bound to multiply. When the young 
indignados gather in the plazas of Spain their life chances are not so qualitatively different from 
that of their counterparts in North Africa. This was not the case in 1968: the social distance 
between a Berkeley student and a Vietnamese peasant was unbridgeable. As to global migration 
the picture is quite unclear. We have certainly not seen the end of migration. More likely we will 
see a transformation of the migration regimes with new countries emerging as sending and 
receiving units as well as real ‘churning’ of existing flows. 
The responses to the global crisis of capitalism have not been coherent and have not 
followed a clear plan of action, Marxist or otherwise inspired. Historical parallels with 
revolutionary waves in 1848, 1968 or 1989 are probably not all that helpful. The Arab political 
revolutions of 2011 will no doubt open up a new global scenario. But so also will the warring 
tendencies of a shaken imperialism putting other countries in its sights. Whether the likes of 
Turkey or Brazil will be able to articulate regional leadership roles will also be critical. This 
complex geo-political scenario is far removed from the current left focus on ‘horizontal’ leaderless 
a-political organising in a bid to recreate ‘1968’. The failure of the World Social Forum – not 
least because it would not be distracted by wars – should be a warning to those who do not wish 
to engage in the long ‘war of position’ needed to articulate an alternative hegemony. The stakes 
are certainly high. As Polanyi warned ‘The discarding of the market utopia brings us face to face 
with the reality of society…The fascist answer to the recognition of the reality of society is the 
rejection of the postulate of freedom….The discovery of society is thus either the end or the 
rebirth of freedom’ (Polanyi 2001: 267-8). 
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We might start by recognising that all successful revolutions have been national-popular 
in nature. Mao, Tito and Castro all had as their reference point the nation and the construction 
of a people. Political Islam in North Africa has also been successful precisely because of its ability 
to articulate the national-popular dimension. The small autonomist currents – with their refusal 
of ‘politics’ – will be no match for these forces once the heady days of public space occupations 
are over. In a heterogeneous world – created by uneven and combined development – any 
political action to be successful needs to go beyond the sectoral domain to construct a broader 
popular will. At a time when xenophobia and national protectionism are bound to come to the 
fore it is even more necessary to remember the vital role of the nation in an era still characterised 
by imperialism of the most brutal and direct nature. The national-popular cannot be so readily 
dismissed as ‘populist’ as the Northern critics of Latin American leaders such Chávez, Kirchner et 
al try to do. 
While some analysts portray the subaltern masses as a ‘multitude’ they do not offer an 
alternative hegemonic strategy. Towards the very end of Empire, Hardt and Negri gesture 
towards the need for a political programme for the global multitude but do not go beyond a few 
platitudes. However they come up with little other than some issues – such as the right to ‘global 
citizenship’ – couched in the traditional language of rights and demands. How this might be 
achieved and though what political mechanisms is not explained. Struggles are not seen as 
connected horizontally, they all challenge Empire vertically and directly. This thoroughly a-
political vision might resonate with ‘autonomist’ currents but it is not capable of articulating the 
various, very disparate struggles against the dominant order now under way. As Laclau puts it 
‘any “multitude” is constructed through political action – which presupposes antagonism and 
hegemony’ (Laclau 2011: 133). Spontaneous aggregation of disparate struggles cannot occur 
without the necessary political articulations and the establishment of a logic of equivalence 
between them. 
Within the trade union movement – and even more within the international NGO’s 
(incorrectly called ‘global civil society’ by some) – there has been a tendency to answer the crisis 
from a rights-based perspective. A prime example is the Decent Work Campaign (DWC) 
promoted by the ILO, the international trade union movement and the European Commission.  
It is a concept and programme ‘based on the understanding that work is a source of personal 
dignity, family stability, peace in the community, democracies that deliver for people and 
economic growth that expands opportunities for productive jobs and enterprise development’ 
(ILO 2013). Its core objective is ‘to obtain recognition and respect for the rights of workers’ 
(ILO 2013). I will return to the limitations of the decent work campaign or agenda as a labour 
strategy shortly, but for now I want to raise the limitations of a rights-based strategy more 
generally. While this is not the place to assess the broader issue of whether the international 
human rights movement is more part of the problem than the solution we should note that the 
human rights regime reflects the ethics and politics of a particular period in Western Europe. It is 
also probably true that it promises more than it can possibly deliver. It has undoubtedly served at 
times to legitimate repression and bad governance. The only point I want to make here however, 
following Kennedy is that: ‘human rights has so dominated the imaginative space of 
emancipation that alternatives can now only be thought… as negations of what human rights 
asserts – passion to its reason, local to its global, etc.’ (Kennedy 2001: 108). In brief, a human 
rights optic might hinder the development of a rounded politics of transformation for the current 
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era. As Kennedy reminds us ‘speaking rights to politics is not the same as speaking truth to 
power’ (Kennedy  2001: 121) 
The 19th Century struggle over the abolition of slavery provides some contemporary 
lessons, I would argue, in relation to the struggles for basic freedoms in the context of a global 
crisis of capitalism. The dominant narrative of abolitionism and emancipation focused on the 
British and North American cases and prioritised liberal campaigns and the discourse of human 
rights. The seemingly peaceful achievement of abolition in relation to the Atlantic slave trade has 
been portrayed as normative. However, this narrative and its elevation of human rights (‘Am I 
not a brother?’) omits much of the complex story of struggle which resulted in the original 
abolition of slavery. As Robin Blackburn forcefully reminds us, the Haitian Revolution disrupts 
this liberal narrative, and more generally that ‘the African captives resisted enslavement at every 
point in their translation to the New World’ (Blackburn 2011a: 358) and that this resistance 
became a significant force during times of crisis, not least thought its impact on the abolitionists.  
Furthermore, anti-slavery is inseparable from the influence of feminist emancipationism and the 
egalitarianism of the labour movement which, on the whole, strenuously opposed forced labour 
of any kind. 
 I am not suggesting that the struggle to abolish slavery can serve as a model to abolish 
contemporary wage slavery and the degradation of work. What I am arguing is that the struggle 
of workers – through trade unions and other bodies – is not a separate sphere from the broader 
struggle for social transformation. Nor for that matter is labour migration a separate sphere as 
Stephen Castles (2010) has recently pointed out but, rather, part of the overall process of social 
transformation. So, for example, the struggles for workers’ rights in Egypt cannot be separated 
from the momentous social, political and cultural transformations currently underway in that 
country.  A European ‘industrial relations’ paradigm has very little purchase indeed in most parts 
of the world. A United Nations or NGO ‘human rights’ perspective has even less relevance 
beyond the rhetorical domain. The world of workers which we now turn to, has always known 
the value of politics, of direct action, of mass struggles and an understanding that social 




 The working class – Marx’s proletariat – came into being with the emergence of 
capitalism as a mode of production characterised by ‘free’ wage labour. Extra-economic coercion 
gave way to the dull compulsion of market forces. The international dimension – and the role of 
migrant workers in particular – was crucial in this early making of the working class (cf. Linden 
2003). Free migration across national borders was considered normal and xenophobia was not 
always present; internationalism in the economic sense was thus not forced but natural. But this 
early internationalist phase was short-lived as state formation began to lead to the national 
integration of the European working classes in particular, culminating in the first inter-
imperialist war of 1914-18. Trade unions were ‘nationalised’ as it were, becoming an integral 
element of social and political cohesion within the boundaries of a given nation–state. The 
formation of trade unions in the so-called developing world, following the second inter-
imperialist war of 1938-45 also took a strongly national character with the workers and their 
organisations playing a key role in many national liberation struggles. 
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 Both Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi understood that capitalism would not realize its full 
potential until it was globalised. For Marx and Engels, ‘The bourgeoisie has through its 
exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption 
in every country. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have 
intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations’ (Marx and Engels 1970).  
Polanyi, for a different historical period was to write that, ‘The true implications of economic 
liberalism can now be taken in at a glance. Nothing less than a self-regulating market on a world 
scale could ensure the functioning of this stupendous mechanism’ (Polanyi 2001: 145).  
Globalisation – as it unfolded from the 1980’s onwards – utterly transformed the world of work.  
There was, in first place, a massive increase in proletarianisation as millions more were brought 
under the sway of capital. National development regimes were soon to be superseded along with 
the state socialist system. This led to a shift from the ‘formal’ to the ‘real’ subsumption of labour. 
However, in second place we need to stress that this global proletarianisation took place under 
the aegis of imperialism and was thus marked by a racist template. 
 Labour in the global era is characterised, above all, by increased mobility, within and 
between nation-states. In 1970 there were 82 million people living outside their country of birth; 
by 2000 this figure had risen to 175 million. But it is good to remember that the internal 
migrants in China and India are probably double that number and we should always take 
migration in the round from a development perspective. Migrant workers represent a return to 
colonial-era forced labour patterns as the export of cheap labour (or its transfer within country) 
becomes a viable and legitimate path to development. Hardt and Negri may sound apocalyptic 
but there is a ring of truth to their proclamation that, ‘A specter haunts the world and it is the 
specter of migration’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 213). The problem is translating this complex new 
reality into a politics of transformation that goes beyond an extolling of flight as a response to 
oppression. The migrant is in a liminal position betwixt and between borders or the rural/urban 
divide, partly mobile, partly settled. They represent a challenge to the organised (settled) workers 
movement as we have argued, but also for the managers of globalization and will be a less case in 
determining whether sustainable global development is achievable. 
 The other key feature of the labour condition in the era of globalisation is that of 
flexibility, which became the leitmotif of the neoliberal restructuring of labour. For globalizing 
capital the flexibilisation of labour was a key imperative: this entailed functional flexibility, wage 
flexibility and numerical flexibility. This drive was global in nature even though it took different 
national forms according to the degree and type of labour market embeddedness and the strength 
of the labour movement. The latter responded with a call for a ‘social clause’ to be included in 
multilateral trade agreements to prevent ‘social dumping’ across borders. At the end of the day 
there was little to show for this campaign beyond a few showcase European firms agreements on 
paper. The old labour strategies were bound to fail when the terrain set by capital had changed so 
dramatically. Flexibilisation was but a part of a concerted strategy by capital to weaken labour 
through de-regulation across the board and a so-called ‘informalization’ of the relations of 
production. 
 Perhaps the most salient mutations of the global political economy of labour can be 
encapsulated with the term Brazilianization, first deployed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck 
(2000). For Beck, ‘The unintended consequence of the neoliberal free-market utopia is a 
Brazilianization of the West… the spread of temporary and insecure employment, discontinuity 
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and loose informality into Western societies that have hitherto been the bastions of full 
employment’ (Beck 2001: 1). Precarious, insecure or informal relations of production accounted 
for maybe one tenth of employees in 1960’s Germany, but that figure is now around 40 percent 
and rising. There is a problem in the way Beck assumes the West is the norm and we may also 
question whether the ‘golden era’ of capitalism was really that secure for workers in the West in 
the 1950’s. Nevertheless, it is a useful way of bringing home the changes wrought by 
globalisation and the impact of neoliberalism on the relations of production and the lives of 
working people.  
 What Brazilianization might mean is a reversal of Marx’s famous dictum that, ‘The 
country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed the image of its 
own future’. Unregulated and informal relations of production and income generation are not 
‘marginal’ to capitalist development or simply the dubious privilege of under-development. The 
World Bank was simply wrong in theory and in practice when it stated that ‘the informal sector 
shrinks with development’ (World Bank 1995: 35). Indeed, we can now posit the emergence of a 
new global informal working class which, following Davis, ‘is about one billion strong, making it 
the fastest-growing, and most unprecedented, social class on earth’ (Davis 2007: 178).  The great 
expansion of the informal sector across the global South since the 1980’s was accompanied by its 
emergence in the North as ‘a stealth workforce for the formal economy’ (Davis 2007: 178) with 
the likes of Wal-Mart and other multinationals creating commodity chains reaching deep into 
the informal sector across the South. What we see today is a pattern beyond the old formal- 
informal (or North-South) divide, with a continuum of casualization as the global recession 
continues to impact on the world of work. 
 An emerging social paradigm we might finally consider is that of the ‘precariat’, 
constructed as a hybrid term describing a proletariat subject to precarious working conditions. It 
is designed to capture the new norm of insecure work and fragile/fragmented life conditions 
(Hall-Jones 2009). Precariousness is now the norm in terms of tenure, working conditions, 
labour rights and, indeed, life itself for increasing numbers of the world’s workers. Temporary 
contract workers, undocumented migrant workers but also some of the new ‘teleworkers’ (IT) 
form part of this new global precariat. Divisions between working people deepen as national, 
ethnic and gender differences are rearticulated. The feeling of precariousness extends to the once 
secure core of protected ‘standard’ employment. As Mario Candeais puts it, ‘precarisation is a 
general process to dismantle and polarise the levels of social rights and standards of living’ which 
creates ‘a massive insecurity and weakening of individual agency and self-confidence’ (Candeais 
2010: 4). 
          The term precariat undoubtedly has led to a flourishing of critical social thinking around 
the contemporary labour condition. It is drawing on existing paradigms of labour and 
development and has decisively broken with some Eurocentric conceits about its exceptionalism. 
However there is still an overwhelming focus on the ‘new’ precariat of the North on the fringes 
of the IT economy and less on the conditions of the workers in the majority world. I would also 
be wary of statements such as, ‘The precariat was not part of the “working class” or the 
“proletariat”’ (Standing 2011: 6). This seems to imply an essentialist understanding of the 
proletariat quite alien to the classical Marxist paradigm. It is the European image of the full time 
permanent male worker which seems to lurk behind this distancing operation. It is well to 
remember the theoretical and political problems associated with the thoroughly problematic 
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Marxist category of lumpen-proletariat that served in another era to categorise difficult to place 
workers, but at the cost of theoretical incoherence in terms of the role of workers within the 
capitalist relations of production. 
 The long period of neoliberal globalisation, and its current unwinding under the weight 
of its own contradictions, has undoubtedly accentuated the insecurity associated with capitalist 
development. These fissiparous tendencies are now clearly present in the once secure capitalist 
heartlands of the West when once they were assumed to be an innate ‘Third World’ condition 
where ‘marginality’ rather than incorporation prevailed. Yet there is still something profoundly 
Eurocentric in a category that sees the old proletariat as the norm and now seeks to equate the 
flexi-time European IT professional with the conditions of the ‘wretched  of the earth’ in the 
South’s mega-cities. There is still a qualitative difference in terms of life chances between those 
living in the periphery and those in the core capitalist countries, albeit in crisis and with degraded 
welfare states. In brief, while tendencies towards ‘precarisation’ are undoubtedly global we are a 
long way off the creation of a new global precariat. 
 Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1963) who early on articulated a theory of 
‘précarité’, Loiq Wacquant has referred to, ‘The very difficulty of naming the fragments, scoria, 
and splinters of the dualized market society that collect in the dispossessed zones of the metro-
polis as the basis for the term “precariat” – if one may name thus the insecure fringes of the new 
proletariat’ (Wacquant 2007: 73). This, however, is precisely the dilemma faced by Latin 
American social scientists in the 1970’s in seeking to explain the internal migrant informal 
settlements outside the industrializing cities. For some this was a ‘marginal mass’ which did not 
fulfil its classic Marxist function of a ‘reserve army of labour’. The marginal were seen as a new 
revolutionary vanguard by some with nothing to lose. Others understood better the uneven and 
combined nature of capitalist development as ‘normal’. For similar reasons I would be wary of 
positing the precariat as inherently ‘new’, not ‘functional’ or a potential new vanguard (see 
Munck 2013). 
 Having examined the recent mutations of capitalism – as an eminently historical mode of 
production – and its impact on the world of work, the next section turns to the complexity of 
labour’s reaction. Capitalism does not unfold neatly and logically according to the schemas of the 
Marxist-Leninist manuals. Workers, peasants and migrants – and hybrids of all three – have a 
degree of agency difficult to comprehend from a purely analytical perspective. International 
political economy – even in its radical visions – has tended to assume a workerless globe. Social 
movement theory – in the autonomist variant – sees amorphous multitudes but writes off the 
organised workers’ movement. Both currents seem oblivious to the political domain as though 
war, revolution, religion and geo-politics have little impact on society. In the next section we will 
foreground politics in seeking to develop a complex political economy of labour for the 




 Globalization, if it did nothing else, brought to the fore complexity as a fundamental 
concept for critical social theory. For a while the global was more or less taken for granted, as a 
nebula ‘out there’ somehow impacting on what we did ‘down there’. It was seen as a deus-ex-
machina, something like the weather providing us with sunny skies (the sales pitch) or, more 
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likely, the dark clouds of jobs migrating elsewhere. Rather than conceive of globalization as a 
unified, unambiguous entity, the complexity approach directs us towards the relationship 
between structure and process or between a system and its environment. (Urry 2003). In relation 
to the fluid movement of people we call migration, the complexity approach conceives of it as ‘a 
series of turbulent waves, with a hierarchy of eddies and vortices, with globalism a virus that 
stimulates resistance, and the migration system a cascade moving away from any state of 
equilibrium’ (Papastergiadis, cited by Urry 2003: 62). In terms of the workers movement a 
complexity approach would direct us towards the uneven and combined nature of capitalist 
development and the need for a multi-scalar labour strategy. 
 The main institutional response to the precarisation of work on a global sale has been the 
Decent Work Campaign of the ILO (International Labour Organisation) founded in 1919 to 
promote labour standards designed for varying national systems of production. These were 
designed to assist in regulating the national labour markets and offer protection for employees 
assumed to be in stable full-time employment and comprised predominantly of male workers.  
There was also an assumption made that the Western European model of ‘social partnership’ was 
universal. This was a labour policy for the Keynesian era based on built in full employment and 
the efficacy of macro-economic policy management. In the very different global order of the 
1990’s – after the collapse of Keynesianism, the death of full employment and the crisis of 
‘competitiveness’ – the ILO launched the Decent Work Campaign as a response to the global 
labour predicament. It was a step back from the historic labour directives and posed a vague 
aspiration to ‘humanize’ globalisation through a non-ideological set of aspirations. 
 However the world today is not the world of 1919 or even that of 1969 when the ILO 
received the Nobel Peace Prize. As Guy Standing puts it, ‘the ILO was set up as a means of 
legitimizing labourism, a system of employer-employee relations based on the standard 
employment relationship, and a means of taking labour out of international trade’ (Standing 
2008: 380). Tripartite labour relations are hardly the dominant model today, the ‘standard’ 
employment relationship survives only in small pockets, and labour is treated very clearly as a 
commodity on the global labour market. It seems utopian to posit a capital-state-labour tripartite 
alliance in today’s crisis to create ‘decent work’ for all. It would appear to be more part of the 
recent move by international financial institutions to create a so-called Post Washington 
Consensus designed to overcome the contradictions of the raw neoliberal model. For the 
international trade unions to invest energy in this campaign might seem futile from a worker 
perspective, although it may well form part of the system of political alliances which the union 
leadership needs to forge. 
 Critical social thinking – cognisant of complexity – might direct us elsewhere to develop 
a workers’ strategy and revert the currently subaltern states of labour. A useful starting point 
might be the so-called law of uneven and combined development first developed by Trotsky in 
the context of the Russian Revolution. Following Lenin’s understanding that capitalism always 
developed unevenly across space, he added the proviso that it was also ‘combined’ in one world 
system. Imperialism, for Trotsky, ‘links up incomparably more rapidly and more deeply the 
individual national and continental units into a single entity’ (Trotsky 1970: 20). Thus a country 
like Russia at the start of the 20th century could present an amalgam of archaic production 
systems alongside the most contemporary forms. It also meant that the Russian proletariat could 
‘skip stages’ and begin the construction of socialism without having to go through the 
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development of capitalism. In one stroke Trotsky surpassed the dominant evolutionary 
perspective of both Second and Third International Marxism, which also of course underpinned 
mainstream modernization theory in the 1950’s. 
 More recently critical social theory has added a much needed spatial dimension to its 
analysis of the political economy of labour. The notion of ‘scales’ emerged in the 1990’s to 
challenge the traditional understandings of political and social processes. Globalisation had not 
produced a flat world and the local, national and regional scales of human activity were vital.  
The labour movement clearly operates at a local, national, sub-regional, regional, sub-global and 
global levels through different organisational forms ranging from the international trade union 
confederations to local union branches. These scales are not to be seen as a hierarchy and many 
false debates around ‘think global’ or ‘act local’ have now superseded (see Herod 2001). What is 
clear is that workers organisations need to ‘make connections’ across the scales. All trade 
unionists, for example, now agree that the global context is crucial whatever national or 
nationalist orientation they might have. Also, and vital for strategy, the same way countries can 
‘skip stages’ workers are now able to ‘skip scales’, thus for example moving from a local struggle 
straight to the global level. 
 In this complex capitalist world, not reducible to unilinear evolution, trade unions also 
evolved through a variable geometry taking different shapes across time and space. Trade unions 
emerged as collective organisations representing the economic (or workplace) interests of 
workers. Perry Anderson once wrote that ‘trade unions are essentially a de facto representation of 
the working class at its workplace’ (Anderson 1973: 335) reflecting the capitalist division of 
labour as a given. The development of political unionism reflected the rise of the socialist and 
communist parties seeking to harness workers for their political projects. Later, political 
unionism reflected the nationalist politics of the anti-imperialist movements. Workers would 
seek advancement through influencing the national state. More recently – in the context of an 
industrializing periphery – we have seen the emergence of a social unionism. Trade unions, from 
that perspective, needed to engage with workers’ lives outside the workplace and in the context of 
a state which was not permeable. Thus trade unions might articulate wider community demands 
and forge close links with community organisations of various types. The uneven and combined 
development of the working class across time and space has brought economic, political and 
social unionism to the fore in varying combinations. It is this variable geometry that needs to be 
examined concretely and not taken for granted.  
 South Africa provides a rich experience in terms of the repertoires of trade union activity.  
Both political and social unionisms were deployed in the development of independent black 
unions in the 1980’s. Epithets flew back and forth about ‘economism’ (the ‘workerist’ tendency 
to emphasize the workplace issues), ‘populism’ (against those who prioritised the wider anti-
apartheid movement) and social unionism found its role through community boycotts of 
workplaces in struggles and through the so-called ‘stayaways’ (see Webster and Lambert 1998). 
Post-apartheid, since 1994 the powerful COSATU union umbrella body has found itself torn 
between its political role as a partner in the ANC government alliance and its role representing its 
members’ economic interests (see Pillay 2012). The divide between production politics and state 
politics at times seems acute. Another divide is that between the organised working class and the 
growing precarious migrant workforce. Here we have only seen the odd glimmer – or to be 
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precise conference declaration – of the 1980’s social unionism which played a vital role in forging 
a national - popular collective will against apartheid. 
 In Latin America – at a similar time and context – social unionism developed as a 
response to authoritarian military regimes and ‘savage capitalist’ development. In Brazil this was 
most notable with the new unionism of the 1980’s forging links with church and community 
groups and then going on to form the Workers’ Party. Neoliberal restructuring weakened these 
and other labour formation in the 1990’s. Since then, however, there has been a marked 
resurgence of labour with both vertical (from national to regional to city levels) and horizontal 
(across sectors and wider social struggles) links becoming a feature at least in Brazil and the 
Southern Cone countries (see Fernandez 2007). Another political current to emerge in this 
period was that based on ‘autonomism’ represented most visibly by the Zapatistas in Mexico and 
to a lesser extent, the piqueteros of Argentina. In the Nietzschean belief in a ‘multitude’ beyond 
politics this current has ultimately marginalised itself. Elsewhere in the Andean countries (Bolivia 
and Ecuador), trade unions and indigenous movements have built political articulations with a 
revitalized left to seize state power and begin a serious process of social transformation.  
 Meanwhile, in the heartlands of advanced capitalism the impact of neoliberalism – with 
both the ‘export’ of jobs and the ‘import’ of foreign workers – led to the emergence, of a new or 
perhaps, re-invented ‘community unionism’. In the US the mainstream AFL-CL went through a 
leadership transformation between 2003 and 2005 which took it beyond the ‘business unionism’ 
it was once characterised by and previously unthinkable alliances with Latin American workers 
ensued. Up and down the country local and national unions forged alliances with migrant 
workers’ organisations giving rise to the workers centres (see Fine 2005). There was an older US 
tradition of rank and file activity to call upon, also evident for example in relation to the 
campaign for ‘union cities’. In the U.K a strongly labourist trade union movement began to 
sporadically explore alliances with migrant worker associations and the often faith based 
movements which supported these (see McBride and Greenwood 2009). There also ‘community 
unionism’ was the term which came to the fore to describe what was basically the social unionism 
we opened to above, building on (not necessarily superseding) the ‘bread and butter’ economic 
unionism and the political unionism in support of the Labour Party. 
 This is not the place to draw facile conclusions: clearly the whole tenor of my argument is 
to present issues for debate. In many social and political arenas these and similar debates are 
being played out in practice. Their outcome is necessarily uncertain. In terms of the challenges 
posed at the start I think we have sketched out a possible answer based on real social struggles 
and an open critical theory. Existing labour strategies, based on old models and a moribund 
Eurocentrism, will almost certainly fail to deliver in their objectives. The current global turmoil 
is throwing up an existential crisis for global capitalism as we know it but also a serious challenge 
for the subaltern classes and nations. The precarisation of labour is but one strand of a complex 
mutation of capitalism now underway. Thus trade unions need to engage with the political 
economy of labour migration as we have argued, but also with a much wider range of dramatic 
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